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1 Introduction
A fundamental assumption in most studies of game theory is that the rules of the game,
including its payoff structure and the rationality of the players are common knowledge.
This assumption, or the weaker assumption that each player is completely informed
about all payoffs in the matrix, seems to imply that players have unbounded capabilitiea
of discrimination. R.eal life players certainly do not have such powers (see e.g. Millar
(]9~i7)) and, hence, one would like to know what influence a slight weakening of the
cornmon knowledge assumption has on the game theoretic predictions.
In this paper we analyse the consequences of relaxing the assumption that the payoffs
in a normal form game are common knowledge. The context in which we picture our
players is one in which it is common knowledge that a game with a certain structure
has Lo be played, however, the exact payoffs of the game to be played are not known.
Players have a prior on the class of possible games and we assume that, when the actual
game is prescntcd to Lhem, cach oC them makes a slight obscrvation error and, hence,
may think he is playing a slightly different game. The observation errors force players to
analyse all games in the class simultaneously and we show that not every equilibrium of
a given game from the class can be part of an equilibrium rule of how to play the entire
class of games.
Specifically, we will show that this approach makes it possible to derive unique so-
lutions for almost all 2 x 2 garnes having 2 strict Nash equilibria.r In particular we
show that, if (in a certain sense) the initial uncertainty about which game has to be
played is su(ficiently large, players will, when thc observation noise vanishes, coordinate
on tlre risk dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)) for every game that they
~The only gamea tor which we do not get uniqueneae are thoee that are best reply equivalent to
completely symmetric gamea. fíence, we do not say anything about how to play a pure coordination
game. With Schelling (1960) we agree that, in thia case, the uaual game theoretic deacription ia not rich
enough to say anything meaningful.4
actually play.~ To our knowledge, the theory presented in this paper is the first purely
noncooperative theory that is capable of eliminating strict equilibria.3
As an illustration of our general approach and to provide some basic intuition for the
main results, let us consider two examples. First consider the coordination game from
Fig. la.
[insert Figure 1 about here~
The authors are confident that, when asked to play the game Gl from Table 1 in a purely
noncooperative fashion, and without receiving any outside guidance about how to play,
each reader would choose (i. Common sense dictates that one should play the game in
this way, but up to now there is no formal, purely noncooperative' theory that singles
out (~3t,Qz) as the unique rational solution of Gt. Indeed, also the strategy pair (ar,a2)
ZTechnically, we perturb the game, inveatigate limits of sequences of equilibria of perturbed games,
and ahow that only the riak dominant equilibrium of the base game can be approxirnated.
3The point of view that atrict equilibria paesese all nice properties that one can hope for is, among
others taken in Fudenberget al (1988) and Kohlberg and Mertens (1966). In Footnote 3 of the latter
paper the intuition for thia point of view ia expreased ae followa: Whatever "incentive to deviate" may
mean, once the playere expect u to be played (in the game Gr from Figure 1) neither player will have
an incentive to unilaterally deviate. There ia experimental evidence that refutea thia point oC view. The
resulte Van Huyck et al (1988) obtained for a game with a similar atructure atrongly suggests that if it ia
recommended to the playera that they play a in the game Gi, then (even without communication) they
will aucceed to jointly deviate to p. Our explanation Cor the eubjects' behavior in theee experiments ie
that players are firmly convinced that only Q makes aenae, hence, that the experimenter is simply trying
to confuae them and that they can eafely ignore óis recommendation to play a. Our theory justifies
why only (3 makea sense in game Cl .
'We emphasize the term 'purely noncooperative' by which we mean 'based eolely on considerations
o( individual utility maximization'. There exiat theoriea that ainglc out (3 as the unique solution, thc
most prominent example being the selection theory from Harsanyi and Selten (1988), but all these
adopt as a principle that one should not play a Pareto inferior equilibrium, hence, they assume away
the ditl'iculty in Ci. Also the literature on cheap-talk (that atarte with Fazrell (1983)) singles out Q as
the unique solution of Gr, however, in our view the basic aesumption from thie literature, i.e. that any
suggestion to play an equilibrium will necessarily be followed ia not tenable. After the firat version of
this paper was completed we became aware of Anderlini (1990) in which it ia roughly ahown that when
playere aze turing machines, perfect equilibria of the preplay communication game necessarily lead to5
is a Nash equilibrium. ln fact, this is a strict equilibrium (each player strictly looses
by deviating unilaterally) so that it satisfies the conditions imposed by the most refined
noncooperative equilibrium notions proposed today, such as, for example, stability à la
Kohlberg and Mertens ( 1986). Our approach is based on the idea that players will not
analyse the game from Fig. la in isolation but that they rather will view the game as
a special case of a 2 x 2 unanimity game with common interests, and that they will
implement the action that their behavioral rule for playing these games prescribes in
this instance. The class of all 2 x 2 unanimity games with common interests may be
parametrized as in Fig. 16, where B E R. (Note that Gl - 3Gr(2~3).) If players can
obscrve the actual valuc of 0 only with noise and if the observations of the two players
are not perfectly correlated, then it is clear that a player cannot analyse Gi (~~3) without
aualysing games in the ncighborhood of Cr(~~3). After all his opponent may think that
hP is playing Gr(~~3 f E) and a player cannot know exactly what game the opponent
thinks he is playing.
Let us assume that the players' prior beliefs are that B is uniformly distributed on
some interval 0 and that [0,1] C int O. Also assume that players' observation errors
are independent and are identically distributed with support contained in [-E, E]. Note
that, if the observed value of B is sufficiently small, each player knows that the actual
garne is dominance solvable and each player i will play a;. Similarly, players will co-
ordinate on Q if the actual value (and, hence, the observed value) of 6 is sufficiently
large. Intuitively one expects that the noise forces the players, in equilibrium, to play
simple strategies, i.e. player i dcesn't switch irregularly Crom a; to (j;. Let us consider
the simplest possible type of strategy: There exists some B; such that player i chooses
a; if he observes 9; c B;, while he chooses Q; if B; ~ 9;. By continuity each player i
should be indifferent betwmn his two actions at the switching point 0; . By the sym-
metry of the payoffs and the observation errors, it should be obvious that the optimal
Q being played in Cr. Finally, let us mention that Aumann and Sorin (1989) and Mateui (1989) have
constructed modela that torce players to choose Q when Cl ie repeated sufficiently often. Throughout
this paper we reatrict our attention to one-shot games.G
switching pointa must be identical, i.e. 0~ - 0~. Suppose, for instance, that Oj 1 Oz
and that playcr 1 is diffcrent between ar and ~ir when obscrving 6~. Then playcr 2 musL
strictly prefer az to ~z when he observes Bz since both the conditional probability of
player 1 choosing ar and the expected payoff when players coordinate on a(resp. Q)
would be larger (resp. smaller) than the corresponding quantities for player 1 at B~.
Exploiting the symmetry once more we see that, if player i observes B; , then it is just
as likely that the opponent observed B~ G B; as that he observed B~ ~ 9;, hence, at
the observation B;, player i is playing against the mixed strategy that chooses both a~
and Q~ with probability'~z. Since observation errors are small we therefore must have
B; .~ l~z and B; ~'~Z as e-a 0. In the limit as observations become perfect players coor-
dinate on the Pareto best equilibrium for every game from the class described in Fig. lb.
Let us hasten to add that our approach dces not justify playing the Pareto dominant
equilibrium in general. The class of games from Fig. lb is special in the sense that, for
these games, the payoff dominance relation coincides with the risk dominance relation.
'1'he latter has becn introduced in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and will be formally de-
fined in Sect. 3. The rnain result from this paper is that, given certain assumptions, the
imprecise observations will force players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium
in 2 x 2 games.s The game of Figure 2 may illustrate the intuition for this result. (The
game is a slight modification ofone discussed in Rubinstein (1989), we compare our work
to Rubinstein's in Sect. 9.)
(insert Figure 2 about here]
Assume that, in Fig. 2, that players make slightly imprecise observations on B. Also
assume that, a priori, players do not exclude that B might be negative. If 0 G ~ G 100
there are 2 strict equilibria, viz. a and (3, and the latter Pareto dominates the former.
aThere is a unique riak dominant equilibrium as long as the game doee not have the same best reply
etructure as a completely symmetric game, cf. Fn 1.7
However, for small values of B playing ~i; is quite a risky strategy, player i looses 100 if
the opponent dces not match that choice. Hence, player i will choose Q; only if he is
~~unfi~l~,nt rnuugh thal, playcr j will play (~~. Now it. is clcar that i will not bc confidcnl,
euough if his observatiou of 0; is close to zero. Namely, in that case there is a reasonably
large chance that player j knows that B is actually negative and in this case, player j will
certainly play a~ since this is a dominant strategy. Hence, we conclude that for small
positive 8 the players will not play the Paceto dominant equilibrium Q. Now, of course,
one can carry the argument further by induction: Once it is known that players choose
a if B G B' then it becomes risky to play Q if the observed value of 8 is just marginally
above B'. On the other hand, the switch has to occur somewhere since for B 1 100 the
strategy a; is strictly dominated by Q;. Using the same argument as in the discussion of
I'ig. lb the reader may verify that, under the same assumptions as the ones discussed
above, the switch occurs approximately at B' - 50. In the limit, as observations become
perfect, players coordinate automatically on the risk dominant equilibrium of Gz(B) for
any value of B: They play a if 8 G 50 and Q if 8 1 50.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to formalization and extension of the above
intuitive argument. We show that, for the special case of 2 x 2 games, the argument
is completely general, i.e. it does not depend on the underlying class of games being
one-dimensional, nor on the symmetry assumed in the above examples, nor on the as-
sumption that prior is uniform. As the reader can already see from the above argument,
however, it is essential that players conceive of games that are dominance solvable. The
proof is by showing that such games exert a kind of remote influence on games with
multiple equilibria. The reason that such action from a distance occurs is that, al-
though when the noise is small the players may know almost exactly which game they
are playing, it can never be common knowledge that the game is not dominance solvable.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a general definition and existence
proof for global games. In Sections 3- 6, we present and prove our main result. We then
show that, in a one-dimensional setting, the result does not require a Nash equilibrium8
condition but may be obtained by repeated deletion of dominated strategies in the global
game (Section 7). The remainder of the paper (Sections 8- 11) is devoted to discussing
the resulta and their relation to the literature.
2 Global Games
The basic idea behind the notion of a global game is that the information available to
the players can be partitioned into two sets: (i) the structure of the game and (ii) the
game's parameters, and that, although the structure of the game is common knowledge,
each player is somewhat uncertain about the actual parameters. This uncertainty forces
players to analyse entire families of games with the same structure simultaneously. For
the purpose of this paper attention will be restricted to situations in which the common
knowledge includes the strategies that the players have at their disposal. Hence, the
structure consists of the normal form, (some of) the payoffs of the game are the param-
eters.
Formally, for i- 1, ..., n, let A; be a finite set, let the parameter space O be an
open subset of R"` for some m E N and for B E 9 let g(B) be an n-person normal
form game in which player i's set of pure actionse is A;. For a pure action combination
a E A :- A1 x... x An, let g;(B, a) be player i's payoff in g(B) if a is played, and assume
that g;(O,a) is continuous in B and bounded, for each i and a. Consider the family of
games ~- {g(B); B E O}. We picture players in the situation where it is common
knowledge that a game from C has to be played, but players do not know which one.
Each player then receives a signal about which game will be played but observations are
noisy. We denote player i's signal by 8' and write 6` for the support of the random
variable 6'. Letting F denote the joint probability distribution of (B, B', ..., B") we thus
consider as our model of the situation the incomplete information game I' described by
the following rules:
eTo avoid confueion between etrategies in ordinary normal form games and atrategiea in global gamea,
the former are referred to as actiona.9
(B, Bl, ..., B") is drawn according to F
Player i is informed about B' (i - 1, ..., n).
Player i chooses, possibly by using a random device, an action a; E A;
(players choose simultaneously) (2.3)
If B was selected in (2.1) and a was chosen in (2.3), then player i
receives the payofFg;(B,a). (2.4)
'I'his game I' will be called a global game. Note that a global game is an incomplete
information game in which player's payoff does not depend on his type, a type (i.e.
an observation) just describes a player's bcliefs. A pure strategy of player á in P is a
(Borel) measurable function from O' into A;. Letting 0(A;) denote the set of probability
distributions on A;, a behavioral strategy of player i is a measurable function s; from O'
into 0(A;). Denote by a;(s`a;; B') player i's expected payoff when he has observed B',
he chooses a; and the opponents play according to the behavior strategy profile s. The
profile s is said to be a (Bayesáan Nash) equi(ábrium of I' if
a;(s; B') 1 ~r;(s`a;; B') for all i,a;,B' (2.5)
We have
Proposition 1 Ij the joánl distribution F oj (B, B', ..., B" ) as well as the marginal dis-
trábutáon F' oj each B' has a dcnsity, then the global game P has an equáliórium.
Proof. Proposition 1 in Milgrom and Weber (1985) shows that I' has a Nash equilibrium
(i.e. a strategy profile in which the conditions írom (2.5) are satisfied for almost all B')
iflo
(i) payoffs are equicontinuous, i.e. the family of functions {g;(B, .); B E 6} is equicon-
tinuous, and
(ii) information is absolutely continuous, i.e. the measure dF is absolutely continuous
with respect to the product measure dF'o x dF~ x... x dF".
The first condition is satisfied since g;(B,a) is multilinear in a and bounded in B. The
second condition directly followa from our assumption about nonatomic distributions.
Since, given onr assumptions, a strategy of each player i can be changed at sets of
measure zero without changing any player j's payoff, it follows immediately that also a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists. O
Obviously, when the signals are very noisy, the equilibria oí the global game P need
not bear any relationship to the equilibria of the underlying class of games G. We
will investigate the opposite extreme case when observation errors vanish and we will
study the associated limiting behavior of the equilibria of the global game. We have
not been able to carry through the mathematical analysis in the general case. However,
we managed to carry out the program for the class of 2 x 2 normal form games and we
obtained very interesting results for this special case. Therefore, we turn to that class
next.
3 Best Reply Structure and Risk Dominance in 2 x2
Games
From now on we restrict ourselves to the case where ('j-{g(0); B E O} is a subclass of
the set of 2 player 2 x 2 normal form games. In this section we introduce some nota-
tion for this family, analyse the best reply structure, and introduce and briefly discuss
Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) concept of risk dominance.
We write A; -{a;, Q;} for the set of pure strategies of player i. A mixed strategy of11
this player is identified with the probability a; that it assigns to a;. We write a-(~r, a~),
~i -((~i, pi) and a`~3~ -(a;,(3~). Let v;(g) be the loss that player i incurs if he deviates
unilaterally from a in game g(B) and let vp be the corresponding loss when deviating
írom Q. Hence
v,(o) - g;(B,n) - g;(o,~`ij;)
v~(e) - 9;(B,Q) - 9i(B,Q`~;)
For ry E{a,Q}, let O, denote the region of O where ry is a strict Nash equilibrium of
9(e)-
0.,:-{BEO;v;(B)70 fori-l,2}, ry-a,(j
We let D;ry denote the region where ry is a strict equilibrium and ry; is a strictly dominant
strategy for player i:
Dia . - LB E Aoi v~(B) ~ 0}
D;p :-{B E 9p; vo(B) ~ 0}
We let Da (resp. Dp) denote the parameter region where g(B) is dominance solvable
with solution a (resp. p), hence, Da :- D,Q U Dza and Dp :- D~p U Dzp.
Oap will denote the region where both a and Q are strict equilibria, hence Aap :-
Aa (1 Op. If B E 9ap, then g(B) has, besides a and Q, an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
In the latter, player i chooses cr; with probability à; - à;(9) given by'
vA - (3.1)
- v~ f vA
Wh(,n play(,r i Ch(H)9eY a; as in (a.l), then playcr j is indi(fer(rot betwecn a~ and ~3„ if
player i chooses a; with a probability larger than à;, then player j strictly prefers a~.
'Whenever no confusion can reeult, we will drop the dependence on B.12
Hence, if á; is small, then player j only needs to attach a relatively small probability to
i playing a; in order to make it optimal for him to play ~~. In other words, if á; is small,
then a~ is a relatively safe strategy for player j and a lower value of á; makes a~ more
attractive for this player. This is the idea that underlies I~arsanyi and Selten's (1988)
notion of risk dominances. Formally a is said to risk dominate Q if the Nash product of
the deviation losses associated with a is larger than the Nash product associated with
Q, i.e.
a a Q P vl vz ~ v, v~ , (3.2)
and that ~i risk dominates a if the reverse inequality is satisfied. From (3.1) one sees
that re risk dominates (i if and only if
(1 - ár)(1 - á2) ~ átáz (3.3)
i.e. if the area of the stability region9 of a is larger than the area of the stability region
aFor general gamea, the riek dominance relation is defined by means of the tracing procedure and
need not be tranaitive. For 2 x 2 gamea, the relation is trivially tranaitive and Harsanyi and Selten
characterize it axiomatically. For these games the relation also correaponda quite well with intuition.
Furthermore, Harsanyi and Selten give a heuristic juatification tor 2 x 2 gamea. It seems worthwhile to
briefly describe the latter aince it illustratea that our theory is not trivial: On the face of it, our approach
has nothing to do with riak dominance, etill it generatea risk dominant equilibria as its aolutiona.
Harsanyi and Selten argue as [ollows. Consider a game g(B) with B E 6op and assume B is common
kuowledge. There are three equilibria, eo that there is initial uncertainty about which equilibrium to
play. Player j's beliefa about which strategy ie played by player i may be repreaented by a mixed
strategy za; t(1 - z)(i~. Player i doesn't know j's beliefs and, applying the principle of insufficient
reason, he conaidere all values of z to be equally likely (i.e. i conaiders z to be unitotmly distributed
on (0, 1}). Player i reasons that, whatever the value of z, player j will play a best reaponse against his
beliefa. Noting that j'e best responae is a~ if and only i( z~ á; and averaging over z, player i concludes
that player j will play a~ with the probability 1- á; where á; is given in (3.1). Player i will play his beat
reaponae against thia mixed etrategy, i.e. he will play a; if 1- á; 1 át and he will play ~j if 1- á; G ái .
Since player j reasons in exactly the same way, the playera coordinate on a if ái t áz ~ 1 while they
coordinate on (3 if á~ f áz ~ I.
sThis ia the set of mixed strategy pairs a such that a; ia a beat reply against aj (i,j E{1,2},i ~ j).13
of Q. Obviously it is therefore true that a risk dominates Q if and only if
ái f áz G 1 (3.4)
and tliat ~3 risk dominates a if and only if the reverse strict inequality is satisfied. For
our purposes this simple characterization is most helpful.
For analytical purposes it is useful to extend the definition of á; continuously from
Oop to Otr U Op. lIence we define
0 if B E 9a and vp(B) c 0
á;(B) - as in (3.1) if B E Oap (3.5)
1 if 0 E Ap and v~(0) C 0
Finally we write Ro (resp. Rp) for the subset of Oa U Op where either a is the unique
equilibrium or a risk dominates Ji (resp. ,0 is the unique equilibrium or ,(i risk dominates
a). I~ence, using (3.4) and (3.5)
Ra -{B E Aa; á~(B) ~ á~(B) c 1}
Rp -{9 E Op; á~(9) -}- á2(B) ~ 1}
Note that U.r C R7 and that the sets D;7, Dry and Rry are open, y- a,p.
To conclude this section we list some assumptions that will be assumed to be fulfilled
throughout, the remainder. Assumption la) repeats an assumption made above and lb)
is a mild regularity condition. lc) guarantees that C~ includes games that are dominance
solvable and that have solution a(resp. ~), in combination with ld) this assumption
guarantees that each game in Ra (resp. Rp) can be connected with a game in Da (resp.
Ur~ ).
Assumption 1 . The class G-{g(B); 0 E O} satisfies14
a) 6 is an open subset of Rm, each game g(B) is a 2-person 2 x 2 normal form game,
b) v; ia continuously differentiable on 9(for i- 1, 2 and ry- n, fi~ and the partial
derivatives 8v;~BB~ are all óounded,
c~ Da and Dp are non-empty, and
dJ RQ and Rp are connected.
The reader can easily verify that this assumption is satisfied in the examples from Section
1 if 6 ~[0, 1~ (resp. 6 ~[0, L]). Another important example in which these assumptions
hold is the case with O - Rs and g(B) - B, i.e. players a priori just know that they have
to play a 2 x 2 bimatrix game.
4 Statement of the Theorem
We now picture players in the situation where it is common knowledge that a game from
G has to be played but players do not yet know which one. Players make observations
on which garne is played, but observations are noisy. Note that some games in G(viz.
those with B E Da U Dp) are easy but that for those corresponding to B E Oap there
is an equilibrium selection problem. We will show that the uncertainty about which
game is played may help players to resolve their coordination problem in this area. We
assume that the joint distribution of the actual game and the measurement errors is
common knowledge so that the overall situation can be modelled as a global game. We
are particularly interested in the situation where measurements are almost correct, i.e.
we will investigate sequences of global games in which the noise vanishes.
Formally, for E~ 0 and random variables B, e~ and e~ taking valucs in Rm we considcr
the global game I'` played according to the rules (2.1) -(2.4) with the observation of
player i being given by
9' - B f ee' (4.1)15
In addition we will assume that the following Assumption holds.
Assumption 2
a) 9 has distrióution junetian H, and admits a continuously differentiable density h
that is posilive on 6 and óounded.
b) el and e~ are independent of B and have a joint distribution ~ with a density ~p.
cJ The support oJ~ is contained in a óall around zero with radius'~z and the density
cp is bounded.
The set of equilibria of I'` is denoted by E(P`). Proposition 1 in Sect. 2 guarantees that
E(I`) ~~. If s E E(I'`), then we write s; (6') for the probability with which player i
chooses y; if he observes B' (y E{a,Q}). Our main result may be stated as follows
Thcorem 1 . l.cl 0 E II~, (rcap. t1 E llnJ and Icl s E F'.'(I'`). If thc assumplio~es 1 anrl
1 are satisfied and e is small, then sa((1) - 1 (resp. sp(B) - 1J. !n other words, in the
limil as thr noise vanishes, lhe players coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium oJ
lhe actual game.
The following section introduces notation and results that will be used in the proof of
Theorem I. The proof itself is in Section 6. Section 7 considers the special case where
O is one-dimensional. In this case we are able to show that one doesn't have to assume
eyuilibrium behavior in Lhe global game to justify the coordination on the risk dominant
equilibriwn in the limit: The global game is dominance solvable in this case, hence,
rationalizability suffices to obtain a unique equilibrium solution.16
5 Posterior Beliefs and Equilibrium Properties
In this section we consider a fixed global game I'`. We first derive a symmetry property
of the players' postcrior beliefs (Lemma 2) that plays an essential role in the proof o[
Theorem 1. Thereafter we derive some properties that equilibria of global games satisfy.
5.1 Posterior beliefs
Let F,`(B~~B') and F,`(B,B~~B') denote the distribution of player á's posterior beliefs about,
respectively, B~ and ( B,B~) when he has observed B`, the corresponding densities being
J;(B~~B') and j;(B, B~~B'). We will derive a fundamental property, Lemma 2, which links
the players' posterior beliefs about each other's observations. This property takes its
simplest form when A is one-dimensional and has a uniform prior. Then, the posteriors
F~ (B'~B' ) and F2(Bi ~B2) add up exactly to 1:
Fi(B~~B' ) -} F2 (B' ~B~) - 1 (.5.1)
The reason is that, when the prior is uniform, a player's observation does not give him
any (additional) information about the distribution of the observation errors. Hence,
e.g., Fz(B~ ~BZ) is simply equal to the (prior) probability that the difference between the
observation errors (i.e. eel - ee~) is no greater than Br - B~.
When the prior is non-uniform (5.1) holds approximately for small E since the prior
will still be locally constant. Lemma `l generalizes this res~ilt to the case of an m-
dimensional 6. Eor the sequel, it is useful to note the similarity between (5.1) and the
definition of risk dominance in (3.4), a similarity which will be exploited in the proof of
Theorem 1.
Next we formalize the above intuition. Some notation first. For x E Rm and r E 1{,
Ict 1?(x,r) denoLc~ the (I;uclidian) closed ball with radius r centered at x:17
B(x, r) :- {y E Itm; ~~y - x~~ C r}.
If ,S' is a subset of 2m then S(r) denotes the points x in S tbat are at Ieast r inside of S
S(r):- {x E S; B(x,r) C S}.
To derive the posterior beliefs of player i in 1'` after having observed 0' explicitly, first
note that the joint density of the triple (O,Oi,02) is given by
f`(0, 0~, 0~) - ~p`(0~ - 0, 0~ - 0)h(0) for 0 E O,
whcre ~p` is the density oí (ee1,Fe~), i.e.
W`(x) - E-~n`~Q(E-lx) (x E RZm).
Write ~Y` for the distribution of ee' - Ee~ and let t[i` be the associated density. Then
~G`(f' - ~') - f ~v`(t,t - ~' f ~')dt - f ~`(~' -t,{' - t)dt (5.2)
Player i's posterior density of 0~ conditional on having observed 0' is given by
f ~p`(0' - 0, 0~ - 0)h(0)d0
f,(B'IB`) - ff~~(et - e, 0~ - 0)h(0)dOdO~
Assume 8` E O(e) and let h~ ~(0') (resp. h~ (0')) denote the maximum (resp. minimum)
of h in B(4', e). Then in view of (5.2)
~~(B~ - e~)h~(B~) `- f~(B'IB') ~ ~`(o' - B')h~ (B')
Let K be a compact subset oí O. Assumption 2a implies that there exists a constant k





Lemma 1 . For each compact set K with K C 9(e) there exists a constant k such that
for all B' E K
If,(B'IB') -~G`(B' - B')I ~ kE,~`(B' -e2)
Note that, if the prior h would be uniform, then a player's posterior would be exactly
equal to r(i`(B' - B2), hence, in this case f~ (B~~Br )- fs (B' ~B~). The content of Lemma 1
is that this symmetry property remains approximately valid, i.e.
f~(BZIB') ~ Is`(B'IB2)
if thc prior is locally xlmoxt constant. '1'his synunctry property allows us tu dcrivc
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 . For x E Rm and p E Rm`{0}, let Hp(x) be the hyperplane in Rm with
normal vector p going through x, i.e. Hp(x) - {y E Rm; py - px}. Furthermore, let
Hy (x) (resp. Hó (x)) be the closed haljspace óelow (resp. aóoveJ Hp(x). Let If C O(e)
be compact and let k be as in Lemma 1. Then for each xl, x2 E K
1- 2ke G Prob {B~ E Há(x~)~Bl - xl} f Prob {B' E Hó (x')~B~ - x~} G
1 f 2kE. (5.5)
Proof. By Lemma 1 we have
Prob {8~ E HP(x~)~B' - x'} - f f~(B~~x')dB~ G f r,i`(x' - B~)d02 t ke pB~~pr2 - p9a~prZ19
Making the linear transformation B' - x' f x~ - B~, we see that the latter integral is
equal to
1~.,0:, Tl~`ÍBl - x~)de~;
and, applying Lemma 1 once more we have
I ali`(9' - x~)d0' c 1 jz(B'~x~)d0' ~ ke
ve' ?vr' vB'?v~~
- 1-Prob{B'EHy(x')~92-x~}~kE
Hence we have shown that
Prob {B~ E Hy (x~)~~' - x'} f Prob {B' E Hy (x')~BZ - x~} G 1-~ 2ke.
The second inequality needed to establish the lemma is proved in exactly the same way.
5.2 Equilibrium properties
In this subsection we derive some basic properties of equilibria of global games. Again,
some notation first. Given a strategy pair s in I'` we write a~(s~9') (resp. ~3~(s~8'))
for the conditional probability upon observing B' that j will choose ~~ (resp. p~)'when
playing s„ hence
a~(s~~') - f s~(6~)dF,`(9'~B') (5.6)
whcre sj(0') is Lhe probability lhat playcr j chooses a~ when hc obscrves 0~. Also write
V,`(.y~0') for the di(ference in expected payo(fs betwcxn a, and ~i, whcn i has observed 0'
and when j plays s„ hence20
V`(s~6') - f ~sj(9')v;(9) - sp(0~)vp(B)~ dF,`(O,B'~D'). (5.7)
The Assumptions 1 and 2 together with Lebesgue's bounded convergence theorem im-
mediately imply
Lemma 3. For every strategy combination s, the functions a~(s~B`) and V`(s~B') are
continuous in B'.
Clearly, a strategy pair s is an equilibrium of I'` if and only if s satisfies the following
two conditions for i- 1, 2 and all 0'
if v,.~(s~e') ~ o, then s;(B~) - o (5.s)
if V`(s~B') ) 0, then s;(U') - 1 (5.g)
A point 0' with V`(s~0') - 0 will be called a switching point for player i given s. (Switch-
ing from a given pure action to some other action at 4' can be optimal only if V`(0') - 0.)
Intuitively, it is clear that if e is small, s is an equilibrium of I'~, and B' is a switching
point of player i, then a~(s~B`) must be close to á~(B'), that is, it must be close to the
probability that j has to attach to o~ in order to make i indifferent in the game g(B').
The following Lemma formally states this result.
Lemma 4 . Let M be an upper óound on ~8v;~86~~ and let M- mM. !f s E E(I'`)
and B' E Oo U 8p is a switching point for i given s, then




Proof. If f,~(B,B~~B') 1 0, then ~~9-B'~~ C e, hence w; (B)-v; (B')~ c Me for ry E{a,Q}.
Since B' is a switching point [;`(s~9') - 0, hence,21
-hlE G r w;(0')s~(0~) -„p(~')9~i(~)I dh;`((a, 0'~B') G ME,
or, equivalentlJy
-Me G ~v;(B') t vp(8')~ ai(s~B`) - vp(9') G Me. (5.11)
If both v;(B') and vp(B') are strictly positivc, then (5.10) follows immediately írom (3.1)
and (`i.l l). Assume n; (L7') C 0. Ilence vp(0') ~ 0 and á~(U') - 1. In this case the first
inequality from (5.11) yields
vp(9')(1 - a~(s~B')) c v;(6')a~(s~B') -F ME C Me
which implies (5.10). Finally, if vp(B') G 0, then v;(B') 1 0 and á;(B`) - 0, and we have
vtr(p')a~(s~B`) G v~(B`)a~(s~9`) - vQ(0')(1 - a~(s~B')) G Me
where the last inequality follows from (5.11). This again implies (5.10). ~
'I'he next Iernma says that the switching points of the two playcrs are close Logether
Lemma 5. Let s E E(I'`). a) !f B' E Oo(e) and Y`(s~B') G 0, then there exists
e~ E B(e',s) with V~`(s~B~) G 0. 6J If B' E Op(e) and V`(s~B') ~ 0, then V~`(s~B~) ~ 0
for some Ca~ E B(B',e).
Proof. We show a). Let B' E Oa(e). If V~`(s~B~) ~ 0 for a116~ E B(8`, e), then s~(B~) - 1
for all (?~ with f~ (B~~B') ~ 0. Furthermore v;(B) 1 0 for all 6 with f~ (B, 8~ ~B') ~ 0. Hence
Vd(s~B') ~ 0. ~
1'he final Iemma in this section states that if player i's observation is well inside D,
then player i chooses ry; in any equilibrium of P` (ry E{a,~3}).22
Lemma 6 . If s E E(I'`), then s;(B`) - 1 for each B' E D1ry(E) U D2ry(E) (ry - a, ~3).
Proof. Take i- 1 and ry-~. First consider the case where B' E Dla(E~2). Then for
all B with fi(B,B~~B') ~ 0 we have B E Dla, hence v~ (B) ~ 0 and vA(B) c 0. Hence
player ] knows that a~ is a strictly dominant strategy for each game that he might play.
Therefore si(Bt) - 1.
Next consider the case where B' E Dza(E). Then B~ E D2Q(e~2) for all B~ with
fl(B,B2~B') ~ 0. Flence, by the first half of the proof (with the roles oí the players
reversed), s2(BZ) - 1 for all such 82. Hence, player 1 knows that player 2 chooses a~ for
sure. Since v~ (B) 1 0 for all B with fl(B,B~~B') ~ 0, player 1's unique best response is
al for any game that he might play, therefore, si(B') - 1. [J
6 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that there exists B' E Ra for which the statement from Theorem 1 does not hold,
i.e. we can find sequences E„ -i 0 and s" E(I'`") such that w; (B') :- V`"(sn~B') G 0
for some í E{1,2} and all n. The proof, which is by contradiction, is divided into four
steps: First we construct a compact subset If of Ra, which has a connected interior and
in which both B' and some B" E Do are interior points. Using Lemmas 5 and 6, it is
easily seen that If must contain switching points for each player when E is sufficiently
small. The central part oï the proof (Steps 2 and 3) consists in constructing a particular
pair of switching points x' and x2 and corresponding halfspaces which allow us to apply
Lrnima 2. These switching points are~ close together and they have the propcrty thaL,
at least locally, each player i chooses a; íor each observation 0` that is to the left o[ x'.
Lemma 2 then allows us to conclude that the sum of the posterior probabilities that i
assigns to j playing a~ (i,j E {1,2},i ~ j) must be approximatcly eyual to 1. Using
Lemma 4 it is then straightíorward to establish a contradiction in Step 4.
Step 1. Construction of a compact set relevant for the remainder of the proof.23
Since Ro is connected and since Do ~~ we can find 9" E Da and a curve C connecting
0" to 0' wit.ó C C R,,. W.Lo.g. asswne 0" E Uro. l3y Lemrna 5 wc ~nay also asswne that
u~~(0') G 0 for all n. Sincc U~„ and Ro arc opcn and C is compact, wc can find q 7 0
such that B(B",2rf) C D~o and such that B(c,2n) E Rti for each c E C. Let K be the
compact set
x :- U~EOB(c, 2n)
Then I[ C Ra and since á;(9) and wa(B) depend continuously on B
EK
al(B) } á2(B) G 1
(Ó.1)
min v~ (B) 1 0 and min v~ (B) ) 0 (6.2)
BEK 9Eh
Step 2. Construction of switching points. (See Figure 3.)
T'ake n large enough so that e„ is small relative to q, specifically 2e„ G rf. To simplify
notation, write e- e,,, s- s„ and w; - w". Let c be a continuous parametrization of C
with c(0) - t7" and c( l)- 0'. Dcfinc the continuous function f by
f(a) - min{wl(B); B E B(c(~),rl)}
'I'hc~n, by Lc~nma G, f(0) 1 0 sincc B(0", i~) C D~~. On thc otbcr hand f( l) C 0 sincc
w~(0') G 0. Let a' be the smallest zero of f and write x' - c(a'), B' - B(x', rl). Then
w~(0) 1 0 for 0 in the interior of B' (hcnce, s~ (0) -] for such 0) and there exists
x~ E ~)B' with w~(x~ )- 0. Write p- x~ - x' and let Hy(0), Hp (9) be defined as in
Lemma 2. There exists an interval [A-, at] with a- G 1 G a} such that
Ilv((1 - a)x' f~x') n B(x',E) ~~ for ~ E[a-,~t]
Note that for a- a- the intersection consists of a single point, say B~, and that24
B(B~, e) C B'. Hence, when player 2 observes B~, he is sure that player 1 will play
a. Therefore, wz(B~) 1 0. Define the continuous map g on (a-, 7~}] by
g(a) - min{wz(B); B E Hp ((1 - a)x' -1- .~x~) fl B(x~,E)}
Hence, g(~-) 1 0. On the other hand g(~t) G 0 since for ~t the ball B(x~,e) is com-
pletely contained in the halfspace Hó ((1 - at)x' f atxl) and w~(x~) - 0, so that there
must exist B E B(x', e) with wz(B) G 0(cL Lemma 5). Let a be the smallest zero of g.
Then there exists a point x~ E Hp((1 - a)x' f ax~) with wz(x~) - 0 while wZ(B) ~ 0 for
all B that are in B(x',e) and that are strictly to the left of this hyperplane.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
Step 3. Preparation to apply Lemma 2.
In view of the construction from Step 2 we have
a~(s~x') 1 Prob (BZ E HP (x2)~B~ - x~) (6.3)
and
a~(s~x~) ~ Prob (Bl E B'~B~ - x~) (6.4)
We want to show that the RHS of (6.4) is approximately equal to Prob (Bl E Há (x' )~B2 -
x2). Specifically, we will show that there exists a constant k, independent of e, such that
for all x E B(x',e)
Prob (B~ E Hp (x')`B'~B' - x) G ÍrE (6.5)'l5
To prove (6.5) note first that for all such x, the intersection of the set from (6.5) with
B(x,E) is contained in B(x~,2E). Write D:- (Há (xl)`B) fl B(x~,2E) and let á be
such that the ball with radius p f á centered at x' just contains D (see Figure 4).
13y the Pythagorean theorem (q t á)~ - r~~ ~- 4E', hence á c 2E~~q. Furthermore,
onc scrs that, ~~(D), thc LeVxsguc mcasure of U is bounded ahove by (4E)m-~6, hence,
~(D) G 4mEmt'~q. Let M be an upper bound for the density ~ of the difference e~ - e~
Noting that E-mM is an upper bound for ~`, we see from (5.3) that for all x E B(xl, E)
f'roó (4' E fl9 (x')`B'~Ó~ - x) C Prob (0' E D~B~ - x) C p(D)E-mM C 4mME~r~
which proves (6.5).
(inacrt 1~igurc 4 about hcrc]
Step 4. Wrapping up.
From (6.3) -(6.5) and Lemma 2 we may conclude that there exists a constant k, inde-
pendent of E, such that
~Z(s~x') f a,(s~x~) ~ 1 - kE
Lemma 9 and (6.2) therefore show that there exists another constant k, again indepen-
dent o[ E such that
á,(x') t às(x') 1 1- kE
Li~l. x E I~ bc a lirnit point of T~ as E tends to zcro. Thcn i is also a limit point of x~
(Lemma 5) and since a, and az are continuous on Ro we have26
ár(á) ~ áz(x) ~ 1
but this contradicts (6.1). ~
7 The One-Dimensional Case: Dominance Solv-
ability
IL is worthwhile to consider the special case where O is one-dimensional in more detail
since in this case, by making a slightly more restrictive regularity assumption, we can
prove a considerably stronger result, viz. that the global game I'` is almost strictly
dominance solvable. Hence, in order to justify that players should coordinate on the
equilibrium a if B E Rtr, we do not have to rely on the assumption that players should
play an equilibrium of I'`, we arrive at this result by iterative elimination of strictly
dominated strategies in I'`. Given that the notion of rationalizability (Bernheim (1984),
Pearce (1984)) is generally considered to be less objectionable than the Nash concept,
this result is of considerable independent interest.
The intuition for this result is actually quite simple and can be illustrated by means of
the family of games from Fig. 16. Obviously ~; (resp. a;) is a strictly dominant strategy
for each player if B is suf6ciently large, say B~ xr, (resp. if B is sufficiently small, say
0 G x~). Consider an observation 0' of player i slightly below ir. Playcr i knows that
his opponent will play ~3~ if 0~ ~ ir, hence i's payo(F if he chooaes ~3; at 0' is at least
(approximately) 0' times the probability Lhat 0~ is above ~~. For 0' close to i~ this payoff
is approximately xr~2. A similar reasoning shows that the expected payoff to a; is at
most approximately (1 - ir)~2. Hence, if xr ~ r~~, then there exists i~ C ír such that
Q; is strictly dominant for B' ~ àz in the reduced game where player j is constrained to
play (i~ if B~ ~ ir. In a similar way we can construct ~ 1~r and continuing inductively
we find sequences ~„ and i„ such that a; is iteratively dominant if B' G~„ while Q; is
iteratively dominant for B' 1 i,,. From the above argument it is also clear that when ~
is small then x„ and z„ must be approximately r~z for n large.Next, we formalize the above intuition. Suppose the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and
assume, without loss of generality, that there exist B' E Da, B" E Dp with D' G B".
Assumption 2 then implies that there exist Ba, Bp, ~', B' with ~ G Ba G~' G B` G Bp G B
such that
~a - (B,Dn) Da - (~,Da) Rf, - (l~,~'),
Ap -(Ba, B) Dp -(Bp, B) Rp -(B', B).
ál(D) t az(D) - 1 for 0 E[6',D`]
Note that, in the examples from Section 1, Q' - D' and that all games in [Q', B'] have the
same best reply structure as a completely symmetric game (cf. Fn 1), in particular, all
the games in this interval are best reply equivalent to each other. Hence, the condition
for dominance solvability in the second part of Theorem 2 is only a mild one.
Note that va(Bo) 1 0 and vp(Ba) ~ 0 for all i, and that similar inequalities hold at
Bp, so that v;(B) -~ vA(B) is strictly positive on a neighborhood of [Ba, Dp]. Let K-~ be a
lower boimd for this function on [Da - 2e, Bp -6 2E]. For this interval let k be as in (5.5)
and let L be an upper bound on the derivatives of á;(D), i- 1, 2. Finally, the continuity
of the á; functions implies that for every p~ 0 there exists b(n) ~ 0 with b(r~) -~ 0 as
T~ -~ 0 such that for all B
if the distance between D and [~",Ó'] is at least b(rf),
then ~á~(B) f á2(B) - 1] 1 r~.
Let S be a set of strategies in I'`. We say that a; (resp. Q;) is dominant at B' given S
if V`(s]0') 1 0(resp. V`(s~B') G 0) for all s E S. Let .Sw be the set of all strategies and
inductively define12~
D,`~(Sk) :- {B';ry; is dominant at 8' given Sk}
wherc i E{1,2},y E{a,~i}, and
.Skt~ :- {s E Sk; s;(B') - 1 if B' E D,`ry(S~), for all i,y}.
We write D,~ for the set of all observations at which ry; is iterated dominant
D;.r :- UkD`7(Sk)
(Note that the sets D,`y(Sk) are ordered by set inclusion.) Finally, Dy is the set where ry
is iterated dominant
D~ :- D;.~ n Dz,,.
The main result of this section is
Theorem 2. For every e~ 0 there exists 6- ê(e) ~ 0 with lirrk~o ó(E) - 0 such thal
Dá ~(B, 9' - ó) and Dá ~(B' f ó, B). Kence, if B' - B', then the game I'` is almost
dominance solvable (it is dominance solvable in the limitf. !f a(resp. (j) risk dominates
(3 (resp. a) at B, then only a (resp. QJ is rationalizable al B if E is su,(ficiently small.
Proof. For e~ 0 let p - 2e(MK~2L f k) (where K, L and k are given above while M is
defined as in Lemma 4) and let 6- ó(r!) be as in (7.1). We will show that Dó C(6, ~'-ó).
Recall that in Lemma 6 we have shown that Dó ~ Dá(So) ~(9, ~a - E). We will show
that
if x E[90 - E, B' - ê) and Dé ~(9, x),
then Lhere exists x' ~ x such that Dá ~(Q, x~)29
Clc~arly, (7.'L) togethcr with the initial step providecf by Lemma 6 establish the proposi-
tion. Ilence, Iet x satisfy the condition in (7.2). Write s;~ for the strategy defined by
ss(B') - S`
( 1 ifB'Gx
and define s~ -(sr~, sZr). Since va(B) -} vp(B) is nonnegative for B~ Ba - 2E we have for
any strategy s~ with s~(9~) - 1 if B~ G x
V`(s~8') 1[;`(sr~B') if B` ~ BQ - e
Furthcrmore, we have
T;`(s~~B') , F,`(x~9')(v;(B`) f va(0')) - vp(B') - Me
1(vi (B') f vp(B'))(F`(x~e') - á~(B') - MKe)
Consider,for i E{1,2} and j~ i, the continuous function
(7.3)
B' -~ F~(x~e') - ái(~') - MICE (7.5)
defined on (~, 9). If B' is small, the function value is positive while the value is negative
if 0' is closc Lo Op. Flence, thcre exists a zcro. Note that, in view of (5.5), and because
of the definition of b
(Fi(x~x) - á~(x) - MICe) f (FZ(x~x) - ár(x) - MKe)
~ 1- 2ke - á~(x) - áz(x) - 2MKE 1 0,
0 otherwise
so that at least one of the functions defined in (7.5) is strictly positive at x and hence
must have a zero to the right of x. Assume, w.l.o.g., that the function with a zero to the
right of x has Lhe index i- 1 and Iet x~ bc the smallest such zcro. Ifence30
F~(x~xi) - áz(x~) ~ MKE
and xi ~ x with DiQ ~(~, x~ ). Let xz be the smallest value such that
Fi(xi~xs) - ái(xs) f MKE (7.7)
Then D~a ~(~, x2) so that the proof is complete if we can show that xz ~ x. Assume
xz C x. Then from (7.6) we obtain
Fi (xs~xi) C áz(xi) -F MIfE,
and combining this latter inequality with (7.7) and Lemma 2 yields
1- 2ks C ál(xz) f àz(xi) ~ 2MKE.
Now it follows from (7.7) that xi and xZ cannot be more than 2e apart (because in this
case the LHS is either 0 or 1), hence x~ and xz are at most 2e from x. Therefore, (7.8)
yields
1 G á~(x) f áz(x) .} 2e(MK ~ 2L -F k)
but this contradicts (7.2) given the definition of 6. Hence we must have x2 ~ x and
x' 1 x can be constructed. O
8 Discussion
As is clear from the proofs, our main result is driven by the fact that the regions DQ,
resp. Dp of dominance solvable games with solution a, resp. ~i, exert a remote inlluence31
on the region 9ap where both a and ~ are strict equilibria and in this way they deter-
mine the equilibrium selected in that region. To illustrate that the nonemptiness of Da
and Dp is necessary for our result to hold, consider a global game I'` based on the class
of games g(9) from Fig. 5 with B being uniform on (Q, B). (Note that a risk dominates
Q if and only if B G 4 but that a payoff dominates ~ whenever a is an equilibrium. If
B ) 8, a is not an equilibrium and for B E (8,9) the game is a prisoner's dilemma.)
(insert Figure 5 about here]
If B G 8, then a is a strict equilibrium oí g(0) for every value of 9, hence, in this
case the global gam~~ 1'` trivially has a I3ayesian Nash equilibrium where eac6 player
chuoscs a; for cach obscrvation 0'. Sirnilarly, 1'` has an cyuilibrirmt in which players
always ('II(N)4(` ji if Q~ 0. As loug as 4 E (Q,0) and e is small, thc~ gamc 1'` also has an
eyuilibrium itr which the players coordinate (approximately) on the risk dominant equi-
librium of g(B) for each B, i.e. they choose ~3 iff they observe B' ~ 4 (i - 1, 2). (The latter
result follows easily from the Propositions 1 and 2, since, if 4 E (B, B), then the posterior
beliefs in the neighborhood of 4 do not depend on B and B.) We see that the deletion
of a strong dominance region may result in non-uniqueness of the limit equilibria. On
the other hand our result may be paraphrased by saying that if the initial uncertainty is
sufficiently large (in the sense made precise by the Assumptions 1 and 2), then the limit
equilibrium necessarily coincidPS with the risk dominant equilibrium for each observation.
In our view, the results of this paper add strongly to the intuitive appeal of the risk
dorninance criterion.'o An objection that is frequently raised against risk dominance is
~oNote eapecially that our juatification for selecting in accordance with riek dorninance dces not
depend on the prior being uniform. Harsanyi and Selten, in their juatification, (cC Fn 8) truncate the
hierarchy of beliefa by the ad hoc assumption of uniformity at the aecond level. In this case, different
truncations produce diflereM outcomra, For exarnple, in the game of Fig. 5 with (it being common
kuowledge lbat) 8- 7, if eacó playcr i asaigns a sulliciently high probability to player j believing that
i will play o;, then players will finally coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium a. (Formally,32
that it may lead to the selection of an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated by another
equilibrium. This conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance also occurs in
the class of games from Fig. 5. Several authors, including Harsanyi and Selten, argue
that precedence should be given to payoff dominance in case of such a conflict. On p.
356 of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) this choice is motivated as follows
"(...) risk dominance is important only in those situations where the play-
ers would be initially uncertain whether the other players would choose one
equilibrium or the other. Yet, ifone equilibrium would give all players higher
payoffs than the other would (...) every player can be quite certain that the
other players will opt for this equilibrium which will make risk dominance
considerations irrelevant.n (Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 356), emphasis
added)
The global games approach is not incompatible with this point of view for, if ~ is
sufficiently small, the global game admits an equilibrium that selects the Pareto domi-
nant equilibrium for each game g(6). (See the above discussion of Fig. 5.) However, we
do show that if the initial uncertainty is sufficiently large, players can never be "quite
certainr that the others will opt for the Pareto dominant equilibrium: Coordination on
the Pareto dominant equilibrium for each g(B) cannot be an equilibrium of the global
game. If, in Fig. 5, player i would switch at B' - 8, then player j's best response is to
switch at a slightly lower value and then in turn i wants to switch at yet a lower value,
etc. (See the proof of '['heorem 2.)
ln this context it is also worthwhile to quote Luce and RaifFa (1957, p. 110) in which
the notion of risk dominance is discussed informally under the name of "psychological
dominance". Luce and R.aiffa discuss the game from Fig. 6, first with x- 8 and then
with x- 12. (For our convenience, we have relabeled the strategies.)
using the notation from Fn. 8, if z is distributed according to F(z) - z~o (which represents an initial
bias in favor of Pareto dominance), then the argument from that footnote leade to the equilibrium o.)
We do not truncate the hierarchy of beliefs: An equilibrium of the global game determines beliefs at
every level.33
(insert Figure 6 about here)
Luce and Raiffa write that in the game from Fig. 6 with x - 8, the equilibrium a
"psychologically dominates" Q, tor "i[ 2 has any reason to fear that 1 will take a~, then
6~~ dare not take,(iz in fcar of getting -3000, but 1 knowing this has every reason to take
a~, which gives him his best return. But now the argument is cyclic, for 2, having some
rationalization for 1's adoption of a~, has all the more reason to avoid ~iz". They then
go on to discuss the game with x- 12 oí which they note that ~ payoff dominates a.
They write ( using our labeling of strategies)
"Yet if we were player 1 we would hesitate to use ~r on the grounds that
player 2 would argue that az psychologically dominates ~3Z, and as long as 2
can give any rationale for 1's choosing ar, 2 dces not dare choose ,Q2. The
argument is cyclic and it reinforces a even though it is jointly dominated by
~3."(Luce and tLaiffa (1957, p. 110), emphasis added.)
The Harsanyi~Selten point of view is that, if (joint) rationality is common knowledge, 2
cari give no rationale for 1's choosing a~ and then Q is a perfectly acceptable solution.
(n a. global game based on thc class frorn Fig. 6, however, it is easy to rationalize 1's
choice of a~: Player 1 may believe that x is low and that ar is a dominant strategy.
Nevertheless at first it appears somewhat paradoxical that, for example in the gamer~
from Fig. 5 with 9- 7, players are forced to select ~3 even for small e, although they know
that a uniformly better equilibrium is available. Upon closer investigation this is not
paradoxical at all, it is a most natural consequence of the informational conditions under
~~The game from Fig. 5 with B - 7 ia due to Aumann who argues that, if playera are initially
convinced that they ahould play p, no amount of preplay communication can convince them that they
should switch to o. (The point ia that player i always gaina if he can get hia opponent to play a~ .) In
the global game, communication (after playera have received their private information) might make a
diflerence. We have not yet performed a formal analysis of this intereating isaue.34
which the global game is played. The key to the understanding of the phenomenon is the
realization that there is a sharp separation between knowledge and common knowledge
in global games. Fven if in the global game I'` with E small, players know upon observing
0' ti 7 that a payofïdominates ~i, this fact is not common knowledge12. In fact, it cannot
even be common knowledge that a is an equilibrium of g(B), or more precisely, that a;
is a best response against a~ (i, j E{1,2},i ~ j). Namely, let E be Lhe event that a
is a best response against a, i.e. E-{w E SZ; B G 8}. Player i knows that E occurs
if and only if B' C 8- E~2, player i knows that j knows that E occurs if and only if
B' G 8- 3e~2. Continuing inductively one sees that, if e 1 0, the event E cannot be
common knowledge. The phenomenon that lack of common know)edge enables remote
areas to exert an influence also supplies a deeper motivation for using the term global
games When determining rational behavior in a given game situation it is not enough to
look at the equilibrium structure that is known to prevail, it must also be ensured that
the chosen action is part of a consistent plan for all situations that could have occurred
in the underlying class of games.
R.eturning to the role played by the assumptions, let us note the importance of the
prior having a density. Specifically iL is important that the class of garnes is connected
aud that cach ganrc in (a~p cxu bc connccted coutinuously to somc gamcs in I)„ U U~.
(llence, also the connectedness assumption ld is important, but there is no need to be
concerned about this one: All the examples that we studied satisfy ld, in particular,
this holds for the `natural' parametrization (6 - Rs and g(B) - B).) To see this most
clearly, consider a global game based on Fig. 5 where A is a discrete subset of R. A
natural way of letting the observation errors vanish is by requiring that
Prob;(9 - x~g' - x) -~ 1 as e~ 0(all x) (8.1)
12The definition of common knowledge is given in Aumann (1976). For the extenaion to continuous
atate spaces, aee Brandenburger and Dekel (1987). In our apecial case the definition is as follows. Let
f2 - {sv;m - (B,Br,Ba)} be the state space and let E be an event. Denote by KE the event that both
playera know E, i.e. KE -{W; F~ (E~Br) - 1 and Fz(E~B2) - 1], and write K"trE - K(K"E). The
evcnt F. ie aaid to be cormtwn knowledge at all atates w belonging to rl"K"E.35
Hence, in I'`, each player's observation coincides with the actual game with probability
close to 1. Let B E 6. If player i observes B and e is small, then he knows that the actual
game is very likely to be 6 and he also knows that his opponent very likely made the
same observation as he did. This enables players to analyse the game g(B) as if it would
occur in isolation, the games {g(B') : B' ~ B} just add some minor noise which does not
influence the decision too much if both a and ~3 are strict equilibria (i.e. if B E Aap).
Hence, if one expects the opponent to play a(resp. ~3) at B E Aep then in the global
game I'` with E small, the best response will be to also choose a(resp. ~3): The global
game admits many equilibria and for 6 E Oap one can obtain any selection in the limit.
(In the limit one can even obtain the mixed equilibrium of g(B) if B E Oop.)
Of course, the above is not really surprising. What is (perhaps) more surprising is
that, in the case of discrete 0, the results no longer hold even ií there is a real link
between neighboring games. To see this, assume O is a finite subset of [-1,9], write
Bt (resp. B-) for the smallest (resp. largest) value in A larger (resp. smaller) than B,
assume Bt - 6- G e for all B and let g(6) be as in Fig. 5. Consider the global game I' in
which B is drawn from the uniform prior on O and where player 1 always observes the
value of B exactly, but where (if B is not an endpoint of O) player 2 either observes B}
(with probability .~) or B- (with probability 1- JI). Assume a 1 7~s and assume x E O
is such that 8(1 -~) G x G 8a. Then one easily verifies that, for small enough e, the
strategy combination s given by
(at,az) if 0 G x
9(e) - (Qt, as) if B- x
(at, az) if 9 ~ x
(8.2)
is an equilibrium of the global game. Hence, if a~ t~7i then the "limit equilibriumras the
grid size E of A tends to zero is not unique, (although one certainly can only approximate
the risk dominant eqttilibrium if the risk dominance margin is large enough) and one gets
results thaL necessarily are in agreement with risk dominance only if the initial situation36
is symmetric, i.e. if a-'~z. The reason for the discrepancy between the discrete and
the continuous model is that in the former model there need not exist a switching point
B' with V`(s~B') - 0; in the continuum case such a awitching point always exists aince
l;! is continuous in B'.
The above discusaion also makea clear that the asaumptiona that the errors are inde-
pendent of the true game, that they have densitiea and that the noise enters additively,
are to some extent relevant to establish our main result. Certainly, if the errors were per-
fectly correlated with B, or if a player's observation would be completely uninformative,
the results would be completely different. On the other hand, it seems that Assumption
26 and (4.1) can be weakened without destroying the main result. We did not yet pursue
this avenue of research. It should be atressed, however, that Assumption 2c, viz. that
the error has a bounded support, has been made only to simplify some of the arguments
somewhat; this assumption is not essential.
Of course, the main restriction of the paper is that the results only cover 2 x 2 games.
In the final section we return to the issue of whether this assumption can be relaxed.
9 Relation to the Literature
The approach taken in this paper is based on two related but diatinct ideas.
(i) The standard assumption in game theory that not only the game structure but
also the game's parameters are common knowledge is too strong.
(ii) Players do not analyse each game separately, rather they analyse classes of games
with similar characteristics simultaneously, and they search for equilibrium rules
rather than equilibrium actions.
It should be clear that the second idea and the recognition that extra mileage can be
obtained by exploiting it, i.e. by requiring that a solution should be part of a plan that37
is consistent across a larger domain is motivated by the seminal work of Nash (1953) on
bargaining and that of Schelling (1960) on focal points. Schelling argued forcefully (and
convincingly) that the context in which the game is played (in our setup the class of
games) may provide invaluable clues of how to solve each game played in this context.
Nash realised that by imposing consistency requirements on a bargaining solution across
a large enough domain, one can obtain a unique solution for each bargaining game. A
recent paper that also tries to exploit the idea that players will analyse similar games in
a similar way and in which (as in this paper) games are said to be similar if their payoffs
are close together is Fudenberg and Kreps (1990). (Also see Kreps (1990, Chapter 6) in
particular the discussion of Fig. 6.4.) Theír (preliminary) results are not incompatible
with ours.13 Also Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Sect. 3.8) in their axiomatic characteriza-
t.iun uf risk du[ninaure for 2 x'L gawcs folluw thc appruad[ of liukiug solutions of diffcrcuL
games to each other.
Efowever, in contrast with Harsanyi and Selten, we stay entirely within a noncooper-
ative framework. Moreover, our results are obtained by relaxing the rather restrictive
informational assumptions of traditional game theory. Admittedly, it is still an open
question whether global games provide an appropriate model of uncertainty in game
situations. In particular, the assumption that the rules of a global game are common
knowledge may appear unduly rationalistic. An important task for future research will
be to investigate whether this assumption can also be relaxed. We feel that the result of
'I'heorem 2 in conjunction with recent progress with learning models indicates that this
may indeed be possible. In particular, Milgrom and Roberts (1989) show that, for a great
variety of learning processes, the sequence of strategy choices will eventually be confined
to thc set of strategies which survives interatcd removal of strongly dominated strategies.
Nash (19~i3) also descrvcs cn~dit for coutributing thc idea tl[aL by addiug (contiuuous)
noise to the game one can strongly reduce the number of equilibria. Consider the simple
13We became aware of the work of Fudenberg and Krepe only after the first version of thie paper was
completed.38
bargaining game in which two risk neutral players have to divide á B. Simultaneously,
each player i states a demand d; and player i receives d; iff dl f dz C 9. (If demands are
incompatible each player gets zero.) There are infinitely many equilibria to the demand
game, but Nash shows that if there is slight (continuous) common uncertainty about B,
then each player will demand approximately 8~2. Although Nash's approach was not
completely successful (any particular perturbed game still may have many equilibria,
but only (8~2, B~2) is a necessary limit of equilibria of the perturbed game no matter
what the perturbation is), his basic intuition has been confirmed in recent studies by
Binmore (1987) and Carlsson (1987). These authors assume that B is common knowl-
edge but they introduce noise by assuming that players may tremble. Each player's
demand gets slightly perturbed: If player i intends to demand d; then his actual demand
is d; - d; -}- ee' where e' has an atomless density. Binmore and Carlsson show that if e is
small, each player demands approximatcly B~2 - or more generally, the Nash-solution
when utilities are non-linear - in any equilibrium of the perturbed game. It should
be noted that the mathematical analysis for this type of games is very similar to that
of simple one-dimensional giobai games. (Specifically, consider 2 x 2 unanimity games
where the diagonal payoffs are (9, 1) and (1,1 - 9), respectively). Of course there is also
an obvious analogy between equilibrium selection according Lo risk dominance in 2 x 2
games and the Nash solution in the demand game: Both selection criteria are based on
the maximization of Nash products.
Games, like all models, are idealizations that abstract away from many of the imper-
fections of real life situations. Sometimes the idealization is carried on too far, too many
relevant aspects are abstracted away from. Multiplicity of equilibria, as well as nonex-
istence of equilibria in pure stratcgies may be viewed as manifestations that the modcl
under consideration is overidealized. Since the publication of the seminal Selten (1975)
paper on trembGng hand perfection it has been realised that including additional ele-
ments into the model (i.e. perturbing the game slightly) may enable to cut down on the
number of solutions. In this paper, while retaining the assumption that the game struc-
ture is common knowledge, we slightly relax the standard assumption that all parameters39
of the game are common knowledge. In this way, the paper fits into the refinements pro-
gram that was initiated by Selten's paper. This program has recently been criticized by
Fudenberg et.al. (1988). They argue that an equilibrium that is unreasonable (i.e. that
is c,liininated by refinr~rnents) itt a given gatne may not be unreasonable in nearby games
so Lhe analysL uray be wise to have secoud tlioughts about rejecting this outcome unless
he has absolute faith in the model (i.e. in the game that he analyses). These authors
take the poínt of view that every strict equilibrium is teasonable and they roughly show
that every normal form perfect equilibrium can be approximated by strict equilibria of
"nearby" games, hence, that any such equilibrium is reasonable as well. Technically,
their paper differs from ours in the definition of nearness of games and (in their Section
3) in the assumption that the analyst knows much less about the game than the players
do. (In their Section 3, Fudenberg et.al. assume that only the analyst does not know
the payoffs, the payoffs are, however, common knowledge among the players themselves.)
Irr the previous section we already discussed the question of whether a global game
Pc in which the players make observation errors of order e is actually only a`slight'
perturbation of the game I'o in which the players can observe the parameter vector B
exactly, hence, in which the game g(9) that has to be played is common knowledge for
each observation B. (In Fo each game g(~) occurs as a subgame.) We have seen that this
is a delicate issue bccause of the intricacir~ associated with the conmpt of knowledge
and since situations oí common knowledge are difbcult to visualize. On this issue our
paper is related to Rubinstein (1989).
Consider again the game from Fig. 2 discussed in the Introduction and write
A- G,(-10) and B- G~(10). Then A is dominance solvable with solution a, while
in B Q payoff dominates a but a risk dominates (3. Rubinstein considers the following
situation.r' First one of the games, A or B, is selected, each with probability t~z. Player
1 always gets to hear which game is played. If the game is A, player 2 dces not get to
140ur games are slightly different from Rubinatein's but the arguments and the `paradox' are exactly
the same.40
hear it. If the game is B, player 1 automatically sends a message to 2(saying the game
is B) and 2, upon receiving the message, automatically acknowledges the receipt, an ac-
knowledgement which when received by 1 is again automatically acknowledged, etc. The
communication technology, however, is slightly imperfect: each message gets lost with
probability e. Rubinstein shows that there is only one Nash equilibrium in which player
1 chooses at in state A and that, in this equilibrium, players choose a irrespective of how
many messages they receive. Hence, also in this example the game A(which roughly
corresponds to zero messages) exerts a remote influence on game B(roughly infinitely
many messagcs). '1'he proof is simplc (induction on the numbcr of ineasages) and relies
on the fact that in game B it is optimal to choose a; if player i expects his opponent
to randomize equally. Hence, the crucial aspect is that, in game B, át - áz ~ r~2, i.e.
Q risk dominates a. If we substitute higher payoffs -L(0 G L G 100) for the two -100
entries in Fig. 2 and, specifically, if we choose L G 20, then ~ risk dominates a and there
exists an equilibrium where player i chooses a; if he doesn't receive a message while he
chooses (i; if he receives at least one message.~s
Rubinstein considers this example, and in particular the phenomenon that the pet-
turbation excludes the equilibrium that is (in Rubinstein's opinion) most reasonable,
paradoxical since it shows
"(...) that the game theoretic "predictionr for the "almost common knowl-
edgen situation is very different from the situation with common knowledge."
(Rubinstein (1989, p.385.)
We are not convinced. We do not know what the game theoretic `prediction' is for
the common knowledge situation and we consider it premature to identify this `predic-
tion' with the Pareto dominant equilibrium. In our view, if there is a conflict between
Pareto dominance and risk dominance, the prediction should depend on the context in
which the game is played. It is certainly easy to visualize situations where the context
1óThie last reault depende on the (act that the prior probability of A ie l~z. If this prior probability
J~ would be higher, then one can awitch from a lo Q only if L G IO~a. llence, thix modr.l ia very much
like the discrete model diacueaed at the end of the previoua section.41
forces players to choose the risk dominant equilibrium. We have described one set of
circumstances in this paper. An experimental setting where players choose the risk dom-
inant eyuilibrium rathor Lhau the 1'areto dominant one is described in Van lluyck et. al.
(1990). Rubinstein's setting is just another examplc of such a situation.
Another paper dealing with issues of knowledge and common knowledge and with
the discontinuity in Rubinstein's example is Monderer and Samet (1989). These authors
study (using our terminology) e-equilibria of global games based on a finite state space
O. They generalize the notion of knowledge to that of belief and oí common knowledge
to common Frbelief (p E[0,1]). (Common 1-belief is almost the same as common knowl-
edge.) Roughly speaking thcy sbow that, if the set of states of the world for which there
is a game that is common p-believed is large enough, then íor any selection s(B) with
s(B) E E(g(B)) there exists an F-equilibrium of the global game ïor which the payoffs are
close to the payoffs that would result if each game g(B) were common knowledge with
s(~) being played in g(B). (Hence, the payoffs are close to f g(~, s(B)) h(B)dB.) The dif-
ference with our paper is that we work with exact equilibria and with a continuous state
space. The latter is important as we have already seen in the previous section. Indeed,
in our global game, only the set of all games is common p-believed for any p 1 t~z.
10 Comparison with Harsanyi's Games with Ran-
domly Disturbed Payoífs
'The paper that is most closely related to ours is Harsanyi's (1973) paper on games with
randomly distutbed payoffs. In this paper Harsanyi notes that there is no need for play-
ers to actively randomize if there is slight uncertainty about the payoffa of the game: A
mixed strategy equilibrium of a normal form game can be interpreted as a somewhat
iinprecise description of a pure strategy equílibrium of a larger (perturbed) game that
takes this uncertainty explicitly into account. We now describe the similarities and dif-
ferences between Harsanyi's paper and ours. (Harsanyi (1973) covers general n-person
normal Ïor~n games; we will restrict attention to 2-player 2 x 2 games to avoid additional42
notation. )
Note that the class of a112 x 2 games can be viewed as an 8-dimensional space. Writing
0- R8 we can identify B with g(B) and we may write B-(B1iB~) - (gt(6),gz(B)) with
B; E R'. Let B" -(B„ B~) E 6 and let e; be a random variable taking values in R' with
a distribution function H; that admits a continuous density h; that is positive only in an
e-neighborhood of 0. Consider the random game B`, defined by B; - 0; -~ ee; in which
players are almost sure that they play the game 9'. Harsanyi considersls the sequence
of global games {G`}flo where G` is defined by the following rules
(e~,ez) is drawn from Ih x Hz
player i is informed about 0; - 0' -} ee;
players simultaneously choose actions





Comparing Harsanyi's sequence {G`}~lo with our sequence {I'`}~lo one sees that in both
the uncertainty vanishes about which game is played, but that the uncertainty vanishes
in different ways. The models also differ in the signals that the players receive and
Harsanyi's model in addition assumes independence of the players' payoffs. Specifically
the differences are
1. Harsanyi lets the prior uncertainty vanish. In our approximating sequence the
prior remains constant but, ex post, after the players have made their observations
the residual uncertainty vanishes for each observation.
2. In Harsanyi's setup players' payoffs are independently distributed. In our model
payoffs may be correlated, but we do not exclude the independent case.
1óHarsanyi makee some additional aesumptions, e.g. that dif~erent components ofe; are independent.
These assumptions are not essential.43
3. In Harsanyi's model players learn their own payoffe exactly but they don't receive
information about the opponent's payoff. Since payoffs are independent, a player's
obsorvatiun dcNSU't tcll him anything alwut thc opponcuL's payo(Ts. In our rnodcl,
players make (imperíect) observations on the entire game, i.e. they learn something
about both players' payoffs. In addition, playera' observations are correlated.
A final important difference is that we are interested in pointwise convergence of the
eyuilibrium strategies s` of the global game I'`, whereas Harsanyi studies convergence oí
averages. To put it differently, in Harsanyi's model equilibria should be interpreted as
belieis. Formally, let player i's beliefs induced by the strategy profile s from the global
game, a~(s~6'), be defined as in (5.6) and note that in Harsanyi's case these beliefs are
independent of the observation 4' so that we may write a~(s~~`) - aj(s). The final
difference between the models is
4. Harsanyi investigates, for sequences {s`}~lo with s` E E(G`), the limit behavior of
the equilibrium beliefs a~(s`). We investigate for sequences of equilibria of global
games the limit behavior oí the equilibrium actions s;(B) for each observation B.
We think it is fair to say that, although the models look similar at first, these differ-
ences are actually considerable. Hence, it should not be surprising that the results are
completely different as well. Harsanyi shows that for a 2 x 2 game with three equilibria
(i.e. B E ~op) all three equilibrium beliefs can be approximated (including the beliefs
associated with the mixed equilibrium), whereas with our model we can approximate
only the risk dominant equilibrium. We conclude this section with an explicit example
o[ a model that is a hybrid of ours and Harsanyi's, and that contains our model as well
as Harsanyi's as extreme special cases. The mathematical analysis clearly brings out the
dilFerences between the various models. Consider the game with the payoff matrix from
Figure 7
[insert Figure 7 about here]
and associated with it let us investigate the Bayesian game I'(~,e) described by the
following rules44
(i) Given are three independent random variables B, et and e~ each having a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance 1,
(ii) B; - p6 .} ee;, the realization of B; is revealed to player i,
(iii) player i chooses between a; and Q; (players choose simultaneously),
(iv) players receive payoffs as in the game from Fig. 7.
This model is a hybrid of ours and Harsanyi's: each players knows his own payoffs,
but knowing the own payoffs gives information about the payoffa of the opponent. The
case with fixed p and e tending to zero corresponds more or less to our model, the case
with e large relative ,) corresponds more closely to Harsanyi's model. We will investigate
the Bayesian equilibria oí I'(q, E) and show that in the first case one indeed finds results
as in this paper, whereas in the second case, one obtains results as in Harsanyi [1973~.
Note that the game I'(1), E) is symmetric (if player i receives the information "6; - xn
he is in exactly the same situation as when player j receives the information "0~ - x")
so Lhat iL is natural to Icwk for sylumetric cyuilibria. Lct us restrict attr~ntiou to Lhcscl~.
Note that player i will play rY; if ~; ~ 1 and that he will play (3; if B; G 1. We will look
for simple equilibria of the form
- ( 1 if O;1x
s;(B;)
Sl 0 if ~;Gx
where s;(B;) is defined as in Sect. 4. The condition that player i is indifferent if B; - x
may be written as
ltx
2 - Prob(B~ C x~B; - x)
Now, conditional on 0; Laking the value x, 0~ is normally distributed with mean
(10.5)







so that (8.5) is equivalent to
12x-~(xápl
with ~ being the standard normal distribution function. This last equation in turn is
equivalent to
1 f x
-~(x ~Z~(2n2 f e~)(r12 f e2))
2
(10.8)
One obvious solution is given by x- 0. One also sees that x is a solution if and only if
-x is a solution. Finally, since ~ is concave on [0, oo), we have that there is a unique
solution if the derivative of the RHS of (8.8) evaluated at x- 0 is less than or equal
to '~Z, and that there are three solutions if this derívative is larger than '~2. Hence, the
condition for a unique symmetric equilibrium is
z
2n(2r1~ f E~)(rl2 i- E~) ~ 2'
a condition that is satisfied if and only if r~ is relatively large compared to e.
Let us now analyse whaL happens whcn t~ and E tend to zcro. Note from (8.s) that
0~ and Oz are independent in the limit if r~'~(r~2 ~ E~) -, 0, hence, in this case we ap-
proxiinatc t.hc situation considcred by Ilarsanyi. From (8.8) wc scc that in this casc thc
second (resp. third) solution converges to fl (resp. -1). In the limit the switching
E f n46
point x- 1 givcs rise to belicfs thaL players play their second pure strategies, while
x--1 corresponds to playing the first strategies with probability 1. Of course, the
switching point x- 0 yields beliefa corresponding to the mixed equilibrium of Fig. 7
(with B~ - Bz - 0), viz. each player believes the opponent's pure strategies both occur
with probability r~z. Hence, when r~~~(q~ f~~) ~ 0 we replicate the results obtained by
Harsanyi.
The other extreme case is the one where e2~(r~~ f e~) -~ 0. Then 0~ and Oz become
perfectly correlated in the limit. A player chooses his first strategy if Bl ~ 0 and his
second strategy otherwise. This choice is in agreement with equilibrium selection in the
game of Fig. 7 according to the risk dominance criterion, hence, this case replicates the
main results obtained in this paper. Note that the beliefs generated by the Bayesian
equilibrium in this case do not converge to a Nash equilibrium of the limit game (this is
the game of Fig. 7 with Br - BZ - 0), the beliefs converge to the correlated equilibrium
in which both pure equilibria are played with probability i~2.
11 Conclusion
Two central aims in recent game-theoretic research have been to arrive at unique
solutions's, on the one hand, and to incorporate more realistic informational assumptions
on the other. There is often thought to exist a conflict, and thus a necessary trade-off
between these two goals. The concept of global games that has been presented here
iudicates Lhat Lliis need uot be the case. On the contrary, the use of an inforn~ational
setup implying a considerable weakening of the common knowledge assumption has been
shown to generate a model with interesting equilibrium selection properties.
iaThe importance of uniquenesa ie atresaed by R,obert Aumann, who writea in the foreword to Harsanyi
and Selten (1988): "Nash equílibrium makea sense only i( each player knowe which atrategiea the othera
are playing: if Lhe equilibrium recommended by the theory is not unique, the players will not have this
knowledge. Thus it ís essential that for each game, the theory selecta one unique equilibrium from the
set of all Nash equilibria."47
The paper's main message is that something can be gained by moving from the con-
ventional local analysis of individual games to a global analysis of classes of games, i.e.
not every equilibrium of a given game need be consistent with an equilibrium rule for
the entire class of games. The global game approacli provides a natural way to force
players to link games together and to analyse them simultaneously. Unfortunately, this
particular approach turned out not to be easily tractable mathematically and we were
able to pursue its implications only for the restricted class of 2-person 2 x 2 normal form
games. Extensions to other classes of games are therefore urgently called for. In this
conucction i.wo distincL qucstions hccotnc rclcvauL. Thc first conccrns the poasibility to
extend the uniqueness result while the second concerns the nature of the solution when-
ever it is unique.
The authors are confident that the uniqueness result can be extended to other inter-
esting classes of games. As an example we recall the class of bargaining games discussed
in Sect. 7: Players are slightly uncertain about the amount B that is to be divided and
each player receives a signal B' correlated to B. A second example is the Stag Hunt Game
discussed in Van Huyck et. al. (1990): Players simultaneously choose numbers from a
finite set A and player á's payoff is min~ a~ - Ba; where B E R. (The interpretation is
tliat a; is player i's effort, B is the cost of effort and there is extreme complementarity
in the production process so that the output is only min~ a~.) If B can only be observed
imperfectly then uniqueness results. A third example is the class of pure coordination
games, i.e. the class of common interest unanimity games. The common feature in these
examples is that we have a meaningful one-dimensional global game satisfying mono-
tonicity properties similar to that from Sect. 6, and we conjecture that in such a case
uniqueness obtains.
On the basis of a result contained in Carlsson (1989) we also conjecture that, in case of
uniqueness of the limit equilibrium, the selection criterion will be a rather straightforward
gencralization ofthe risk dominance rule that we found for 2 x 2 games.19 Uniortunately,
19Carlseon ( 1989) analyaea m x m unanimity games defined on a one-dimensional parameter epace.48
selection rules based on Nash products of deviation losses may become intransitive in
general (see Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 112 and pp. 216-21?)) and, hence, may be
incapable of selecting a solution. Therefore there is a reason to be pessimistic about the
chances of the present approach generating uniqueness in general. Nevertheless it would
be an important achievement if uniqueness could be established for games where risk
dominance based on the Nash product criterion is transitive.
Naturally we hope that it will be possible to apply our approach to even broader classes
of games. In particular applications to extensive form games could yield interesting
comparisons with the refinements literature. (Sce Carlsson and Dasgupta (1990) for a
related application to signalling games.) At the same time we are aware of the technical
difficulties which may arise. Although global games are based on a very simple idea, the
analysis tends to become rather involved.
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